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Reform at Risk — Mandating Participation in Alternative 
Payment Plans
Scott Levy, B.A., Nicholas Bagley, J.D., and Rahul Rajkumar, M.D., J.D. 
In an ambitious effort to slow the growth of health care costs, 
the Affordable Care Act created 
the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) and 
armed it with broad authority to 
test new approaches to reimburse-
ment for health care (payment 
models) and delivery-system re-
forms. CMMI was meant to be the 
government’s innovation labora-
tory for health care: an entity 
with the independence to break 
with past practices and the power 
to experiment with bold new ap-
proaches. Over the past year, how-
ever, the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) has 
quietly hobbled CMMI, imperiling 
its ability to generate meaningful 
data on strategies for reducing 
spending on Medicare and Med-
icaid.
The controversy involves the 
abrupt termination (or, in one 
case, narrowing) of several “man-
datory” payment programs. When 
it created CMMI, Congress aimed 
to overcome the obstacles that 
had impaired some of the earlier 
payment-reform efforts undertak-
en by the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS). In 
particular, CMMI was given the 
power to waive any part of 
the Medicare statute, parts of the 
Medicaid statute, and various anti-
fraud provisions when designing 
its payment models. To insulate 
CMMI from the vagaries of the 
annual appropriations process, 
Congress supplied the agency with 
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a permanent appropriation averag-
ing $1 billion per year. Most im-
portant, Congress gave the sec-
retary of HHS the authority to 
expand a successful program “on 
a nationwide basis.”
The fledgling agency moved 
carefully at first. Instead of re-
quiring providers to participate in 
new payment programs, CMMI 
asked for volunteers. Many pro-
viders volunteered to become ac-
countable care organizations, to 
develop patient-centered medical 
homes, and to accept bundled 
payments. Some of these ap-
proaches showed promise. The 
Pioneer Accountable Care Orga-
nization Model — under which 
groups of providers agreed to be 
“accountable” for the cost and 
quality of the care they provided 
and could then share in any sav-
ings generated — produced $118 
million1 to $280 million2 in sav-
ings in its first year and an esti-
mated $105 million in its second 
year.3 The YMCA’s Diabetes Pre-
vention Program, which was test-
ed under CMS authority, provided 
intensive lifestyle and dietary 
coaching to patients with predia-
betes, which helped them lose 
weight and reduced hospital ad-
missions. It, too, appeared to save 
money.
But CMMI soon came to ap-
preciate the challenges involved in 
using volunteers to evaluate new 
programs. Organizations that vol-
unteer to participate in alterna-
tive payment models are likely to 
be systematically different from 
those that don’t sign up. They may 
be more organizationally sophis-
ticated, more experienced with as-
suming risk, and better at adapt-
ing to such models — or, 
depending on the design of the 
model, they may be more likely 
to have high preparticipation base-
line spending. A payment model 
that “works” for volunteer organi-
zations might not work for other 
organizations, which is why vol-
untary programs don’t always 
provide insight into whether a 
payment approach ought to be 
rolled out on a nationwide basis.
Making participation in a pay-
ment program mandatory allows 
the agency to correct for these 
selection effects. But such pro-
grams must be designed carefully. 
Conscripting all providers would 
eliminate the opportunity to have 
a control group, thus hampering 
evaluation of a payment model’s 
causal effects. There are also 
problems associated with enlist-
ing a randomly selected group of 
providers: forcing one provider 
— and not its competitor — into 
a payment program could put one 
or the other at a competitive dis-
advantage and could result in odd 
market dynamics. Given the 
choice, some patients might opt 
to go to a hospital that wasn’t 
participating in a CMMI program, 
for example. This type of patient-
level selection could skew evalua-
tion. The better approach — and 
the one that CMMI has embraced 
— is to enroll all providers in 
randomly selected geographic 
areas in a given payment pro-
gram, allowing providers in other 
areas to serve as controls. Such 
mandatory programs were also 
designed to enlist a large, diverse 
sample of providers in order to 
yield generalizable results.
In 2015, CMMI chose hospi-
tals in specified regions to test 
bundled payments for hip and 
knee replacements. In 2016, the 
agency established a similar proj-
ect for hip and femur fractures 
and for cardiac events. Mandatory 
payment programs were lauded 
in some quarters but provoked 
strong, organized opposition in 
others. Nearly 200 members of 
Congress and several provider or-
ganizations (including the Amer-
ican Medical Association, the 
American Academy of Orthopae-
dic Surgeons, and the Federation 
of American Hospitals) decried 
mandatory payment programs, 
with some calling them heavy-
handed and others alleging ille-
gality.
They found a receptive audi-
ence in President Donald Trump’s 
first HHS Secretary, Tom Price, a 
former orthopedic surgeon and 
an unsparing critic of mandatory 
payment programs. On taking of-
fice, Price paused the Obama-era 
mandatory bundled-payment pro-
grams; some months later, he 
formally ended the programs for 
cardiac events and hip and femur 
fractures. HHS also sharply re-
duced the size of the program 
for hip and knee replacements, 
draining the study of much of its 
statistical power. Simultaneously, 
the agency announced that it 
would recommit itself to volun-
tary payment programs.4
The backpedaling is unfortu-
nate and unnecessary. Mandatory 
programs are crucial tools for 
evaluating new payment models, 
and they stand on a solid legal 
foundation. When Congress vest-
ed CMMI with broad authority to 
test new payment models, it em-
phasized that it wanted the agency 
“to determine the effects of apply-
ing such models . . . on program 
expenditures . . . [and] quality of 
care.” Why ask CMMI to measure 
the effects of new models, but 
deny it the authority to adopt the 
best available scientific methods? 
Even more fundamentally, Con-
gress authorized HHS to adopt 
successful payment models nation-
wide. It would not have delegated 
to CMMI the extraordinary power 
to reshape Medicare and Medic-
aid while prohibiting the agency 
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from amassing the highest-quality 
evidence about which models are 
effective.
In addition, CMMI’s author-
izing statute prohibits the courts 
from reviewing the agency’s “se-
lection of organizations, sites, or 
participants.” This provision also 
reinforces the conclusion that Con-
gress meant to allow CMMI to 
insist on participation. What good 
would it do to prohibit volunteers 
from suing over their “selection”? 
They have, after all, volunteered. 
The prohibition makes sense only 
if Congress expected that some 
providers might be required to 
participate.
Statements from the nonparti-
san Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) confirm that Congress 
anticipated mandatory payment 
programs. In response to a ques-
tion from then-Congressman Tom 
Price, the CBO wrote that its ini-
tial budget projections for CMMI 
“assumed that the center would 
conduct demonstrations using a 
broad array of innovative ap-
proaches” and that it “was not 
surprised when CMMI designed 
a demonstration in which partic-
ipation was mandatory because 
that approach offers several im-
portant advantages.”3
If the legal objections to man-
datory payment programs are in-
substantial, the federal govern-
ment’s decision to abandon such 
programs is difficult to defend. 
Without question, they are criti-
cal to developing robust evidence 
on strategies for cutting spend-
ing and improving quality. Current 
HHS Secretary Alex Azar testified 
before Congress that he is open 
to mandatory participation in new 
payment models. We believe he 
should follow through — or we 
will lose a key tool for learning 
new ways of constraining health 
care spending.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors 
are available at NEJM.org.
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